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When Justice Demands Inequality1
John Thrasher and Keith Hankins2
In Rescuing Justice and Equality, G.A. Cohen argues that justice requires an
uncompromising commitment to equality.3 Cohen also argues, however, that
justice must be sensitive to other values, including a genuine concern for individual
freedom and the welfare of the community. Our question is whether the sensitivity
of justice to values other than equality entails that we must sometime make room
for inequality in the name of justice.
One of Cohen’s central claims in Rescuing Justice and Equality is that there is no
inherent tension between freedom, equality, and Pareto (welfare).4 All three values,
Cohen argues, are co-achievable. The purported tension between them, what he
calls the Trilemma Argument, relies on the premise that people are not driven by
sufficiently egalitarian motives. Cohen is concerned to dissolve the trilemma

1

Penultimate draft, final version to appear in The Journal of Moral Philosophy

2

John Thrasher, University of Arizona, jthrashe@email.arizona.edu; Keith Hankins, Rutgers University and
University of Arizona, hankins@email.arizona.edu
3

This work is the product of both authors equally. The ideas were conceived and developed in conversation over a
period of several months.
Cohen’s use of “Pareto” sometimes obscures the fact that “Pareto” is not itself a value, but rather a principle that
governs how we ought to evaluate different states that are measured in terms of welfare, levels of preference
satisfaction, or some other metric. The tension that Cohen is concerned with then is between freedom, equality, and
ways of promoting welfare.
4
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because it threatens the tight connection between justice and egalitarianism. If
equality can only be purchased at the price of either freedom or welfare, it seems
less attractive. Cohen’s argument rests on the claim that our motivational sets are
not fixed. If “people believe in equality,” there is no real trilemma and,
accordingly, our reasons for licensing inequality in the name of justice loses their
force. Cohen refers to this idea—that justice requires us to adopt an egalitarian
ethos—as the Ethical Solution, and he suggests that it is capable of dissolving any
worries that the trilemma argument presents for his brand of egalitarianism.
We argue that Cohen's understanding of what justice requires leaves little
room for the commitment to individual freedom that lies at the heart of liberalism
which he claims to share (even if he disagrees with the liberal about its
implications). As such, refusing to temper the demands of equality generates
manifestly unjust consequences. Although Cohen's claim that justice requires
individuals to adopt an egalitarian ethos has received much attention,5 our
argument departs from other discussions of Cohen insofar as our aim is to show
that, even by his own lights, Cohen's Ethical Solution is not successful.
We discuss the Trilemma Argument in §1 and the Ethical Solution in §2. There we
suggest that the Ethical Solution fails by developing an informal impossibility proof

See especially Michael Titelbaum who agrees with Cohen that Rawls has good reasons to accept that justice
requires individuals to adopt a certain ethos, but argues that such an ethos would not look like the one Cohen
sketches. Michael G. Titelbaum, ‘What Would a Rawlsian Ethos of Justice Look Like?’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 36
(2008), pp. 289–322.
5
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drawn from an example that Cohen uses to illustrate his argument. Cohen’s
proposed resolution of the trilemma implies that for an individual to be free she
must be able to make at least some choices in accordance with her own beliefs and
values. The idea that individuals must have space to live their own lives is further
supported by his discussion of personal prerogatives and the role that appeals to
these prerogatives play in justifying our practices. Each person, he argues, has “the
right to be something other than an engine for the welfare of other people: we are
not nothing but slaves to social justice.”6 In §3, we argue that Cohen’s discussion of
prerogatives and his concern with dissolving the trilemma shows that costs to
individual freedom are not easily borne—even for an egalitarian as
uncompromising as Cohen. If the Ethical Solution fails then, as we argue it does, then
Cohen cannot have all he wants and his criticism of liberalism loses much of its
force.
To show that the Ethical Solution does indeed fail, in §4 we develop a second
impossibility proof which draws upon an example borrowed from Aristophanes.
There we argue that because freedom, equality, and Pareto will not always be coachievable, a genuine commitment to each necessarily requires making trade-offs.
In §5, we conclude that a genuine commitment to respecting individual freedom
means that inequalities will sometimes be justified in the name of justice.

6

G. A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 10.
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1. The Trilemma Argument
At the heart of Rescuing Justice and Equality is a claim that freedom, equality, and
welfare are co-achievable.7 Justice involves a commitment to all three values, but
does not require trade-offs between them. Cohen uses a number of examples to
support this claim. Each example compares various states of affairs, distinguished
by how hard certain individuals decide to work or what occupations they decide to
take up, and asks how they fare as measured against various metrics. Although
Cohen does not himself utilize these tools, the structure of his examples makes
them especially amenable to analysis using some of the tools of social choice
theory.8 Utilizing these tools we can compare, as Cohen does, various states of
affairs and ask whether they can be achieved consistently with a range of suitably
formalized ideals. This is helpful because it delivers a degree of precision that
Cohen’s arguments (persuasive as they might be) otherwise lack. Ultimately,
however, by developing an informal impossibility proof we will argue, contra
Cohen that freedom, equality, and Pareto, as metrics for evaluating states of affairs
cannot always be mutually satisfied. As a result, if justice is to incorporate each

7

Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, pp. 181–225.

We are largely following an approach derived from the application of social choice theory to ethics pioneered by
Amartya Sen, but this basic approach does not require all of the assumption of traditional social choice theory. For
a similar axiomatic treatment of related issues see: Michael Huemer, ‘Non-Egalitarianism’, Philosophical Studies, 114
(2003), 147–171.
8
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metric it must include a mechanism for balancing them in cases where they
conflict.
Before we look at the proof itself, though, we first need to define the different
metrics in question and, because many critics are likely to object that the social
choice approach we adopt is foreign to Cohen, say a few things to defend our
approach. Although, as we suggested above, Cohen does not explicitly use the
framework of social choice theory, his examples are set up in a way that mimics the
structure of problems analyzed in the social choice literature and his analysis of
these examples sometimes parallels the social choice approach we utilize. More
importantly, Cohen discusses in detail Amartya Sen’s famous argument for the
impossibility of Paretian liberalism.9 Sen, of course, explicitly utilizes the sort of
social choice approach we adopt, and Cohen’s discussion of Sen clearly suggests
that he takes Sen’s argument to bear on the thesis he wishes to defend.10 We take it,
then, that Cohen has opened the door for the use of these tools in analyzing his
own argument.
Turning to the formalized metrics we will utilize, for welfare we use the
notion of weak Pareto described by Sen and others. Following Sen, the weak Pareto
condition states that “if every individual prefers an alternative x to another

9

Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, pp. 187–188.

10

Amartya Sen, ‘The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal’, The Journal of Political Economy, 78 (1970), 152–157.
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alternative y, then society must prefer x to y.”11 This is clearly the Pareto condition
Cohen has in mind and it implies that for justice to be consistent with Pareto it
cannot identify a state of affairs as just when there are alternative states available
that are unanimously preferred to it.12
Moving on to freedom, in his discussion of the trilemma argument Cohen
focuses on freedom of occupational choice. Freedom, he writes, requires “that
people not be coerced into particular jobs, whether by direct state order or by
something else that also deserves to be called coercive.”13 Utilizing our approach,
however, requires something more formal and so for our freedom metric we again
borrow a metric from Sen, namely his notion of minimal liberalism.14 Following Sen,
this condition states that for every individual A, there is at least one pair of
alternatives {x, y} such that if A prefers x to y, society must prefer x to y, in the sense
that it cannot coerce A into choosing y over x.15 While there is considerable debate
about the definitions of freedom utilized by Sen, we think the notion captures what
11

Sen, ‘The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal’, p. 153.

Cohen writes: “The relevant Pareto requirement is the (weak) one that condemns preserving a state of affairs in
which everyone can be made better off” Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p. 184.
12

Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p. 184. Of course, Cohen is not interested only in freedom of occupational
choice, he merely uses it to illustrate his argument, but if we can show that there exists an unavoidable tension
between this sort of freedom and equality, then our argument generalizes to freedom more broadly construed.
14 Sen, ‘The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal’, p. 154.
13

Note that the Freedom condition also requires that A be free to decide which pair of alternatives she is decisive
over. This is necessary to ensure that the condition is substantive; otherwise, the condition could be trivially met by
providing an individual with decisiveness over two worthless alternatives.
15
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Cohen has in mind within the context of his example.16 For instance, although
Cohen criticizes the conclusion that Sen draws from his proof, he does not argue
that the minimal liberalism condition is an inadequate model of liberal rights.17
Further, a simple example illustrates that this condition is analogous with the basic
conception of freedom of occupation Cohen sketches. If Roxanne prefers one job
to another and both are offered to her, freedom dictates that society cannot coerce
her into choosing her less preferred job. It is in that sense that her decision about
what job to take is decisive.18
The third value, equality, is the hardest to specify because Cohen’s
discussion of it is surprisingly unclear. Cohen writes that “egalitarians like [him]
think that justice is served only if people’s access to desirable conditions of life is
equal,” but he suggests that for the purposes of the trilemma Argument, “the
relevant equality might be only that no one is substantially better off than others are
with respect to both income and job satisfaction.”19 The challenge then is to specify
what it would mean for access to the desirable conditions of life to be equal, or for

For an overview of the debate on Sen’s argument of the impossibility of a Paretian liberalism and Sen’s responses
to critics see: Amartya Sen, ‘Rights: Formulation and Consequences’, in Rationality and Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2002), pp. 439–461.
16

17

See Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p. 187.

In the case where Roxanne is presented with multiple job offers, freedom requires that she be able to eliminate at
least one from consideration, so that she cannot be forced to accept a job that she least prefers.
18

19

Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p. 184.
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some to be substantially better off than others. Fortunately, Cohen spends much of
the book discussing Rawls’s difference principle that lends itself well to formalization,
and Cohen defends a particularly demanding interpretation of the difference
principle that is easier still to formalize.20 Following Cohen’s discussion of the
difference principle, we assume that equality means maximizing, by their own
lights, the condition of the least well off.21 On this definition, equality implies that
given a pair of alternatives {x, y} if x maximizes the condition of the least well off,
then x is more just than y. As a result, at least as a matter of justice, society ought to
prefer x to y. While there is much more that can and should be said about equality,
this definition provides us with the specificity required to analyze the trilemma
argument and Cohen’s proposed solution to it.
Before moving on it is also important to say something about the concept of
preference we utilize. There is often some confusion about what it means to prefer
one alternative to another, and indeed, Cohen is somewhat unclear about what he
means by preference. In order to avoid confusion, then, we employ a technical
The version of the difference principle that Cohen favors requires that we maximize the well-being (or primary
goods available to) the worst off, that labor burden be included in the distributive metric, and that the demands of
the difference principle extend to individuals’ actions and decisions as opposed to being restricted to the structure of
our major social institutions. See: Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, Chapter 1, Part III and Chapter 2.
20

In utilizing this variant of the difference principle as our equality metric, however, we do not mean to be taking a
stand on the question of whether the difference principle licenses inequalities to some that might be necessary as
incentives to induce them to do work that redounds to the benefit of others. Further, we do not mean to be claiming
that the difference principle is ultimately the best way of understanding what equality demands of us. Cohen clearly
thought that equality was best understood as requiring that persons have "equal access to advantages." For analyzing
the trilemma argument, however, using the difference principle as a metric of equality is sufficient and does not
contradict the spirit of Cohen's argument.
21
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sense of preference that is clearer than the ordinary notion. Although the ordinary
notion of preference allows us to say that we can sometimes choose an act that we
might not prefer to do (perhaps because we are required to do by some type of duty),
the technical sense of preference we employ subsumes all considerations that lead
to action.22 This notion of preference then is both essentially comparative and all
things considered, so that to prefer something is to prefer it to something else.23
Having described the approach we will use, we can now turn our attention
to the primary example that Cohen uses to illustrate the trilemma. Cohen’s
example involves a person that we call Epicurean Doctor, who enjoys gardening, but
will work as a doctor if her wage is sufficiently high.24 Epicurean Doctor is willing to
give up the pleasure and satisfaction she gets from gardening if she is paid $30,000
more dollars to be a doctor, but if offered the same wage for each job, say $20,000,
she prefers to be a gardener. Whatever she chooses, Cohen stipulates, she is much
better off than most other people are in her society, and further, doctoring imposes

One account, among many, of the technical sense of preference employed here is found in S.I. Benn and G.W.
Mortimore, ‘Technical Models of Rational Choice’, in Rationality and the Social Sciences, 1976, pp. 160–161. This is
also the account of preference normally employed in the social choice literature. A good recent discussion can also
be found in Daniel M. Hausman, Preferences, Value, Choice, and Welfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2011), Chapters 1 & 2 .
22

This is considerable philosophical debate on the nature and grounding of preferences as well as with their
relationship to psychological states such as beliefs and desires. On these questions, we remain silent. Though
important, they are not strictly relevant to our discussion here. For a particularly compelling discussion on the
problem of John Broome, ‘Rationality and the Sure-Thing Principle’, in Thoughtful Economic Man: Essays on Rationality,
Moral Rules, and Benevolence, ed. by Gay Meeks (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 74–102.
23

24

Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, chap. 5 section 2.
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no hardships on her over and above the fact that she prefers gardening. Her
society, however, needs doctors and so society would most prefer to pay Epicurean
Doctor only $20,000 to work as a doctor, but would also prefer to have her work as a
doctor at $50,000 than to have her spend her days gardening. Assuming nobody
else cares whether Epicurean Doctor is able to pursue her passion for gardening, and
(to simplify things) if society as a whole is responsible for directly paying doctors,
then we have a divergence between Epicurean Doctor’s preferences and society’s
preferences.25
As we suggested above, we can model justice as a social choice rule that
ranks the three occupational choices that confront Epicurean Doctor given her
preferences and everyone else’s which are represented in table 1 below:
Table 1

Epicurean Doctor

Everyone Else

(a) Doctor at $50,000

(c) Doctor at $20,000

(b) Gardener at $20,000

(a) Doctor at $50,000

(c) Doctor at $20,000

(b) Gardener at $20,000

In a forthcoming review of Rescuing Japa Pallikkathayil argues that it is unclear on what grounds Cohen is
committed to caring about the absolute condition of the worst off (or anyone for that matter). As such it's not clear
how justice should constrain the choice of occupations at equal wages (or levels of welfare). For instance,
Pallikkathayil argues that although Cohen sometimes suggests that a commitment to equality is enough to motivate
the choice of, for example, more socially useful occupations, this seems like a mistake. See Japa Pallikkathayil,
‘Review of G.A. Cohen’s Rescuing Justice and Equality’, Journal of Philosophy (Forthcoming).
25
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Epicurean Doctor has the preference ordering a > b > c, while Everyone Else has the
preference ordering c > a > b. The question that the proponent of the trilemma
argument forces us to ask is how justice responds to these divergent preferences,
and in particular whether a social choice rule modeling justice can mutually satisfy
the constraints presented by equality, freedom, and Pareto as we have defined
them?
Both Epicurean Doctor and Everyone Else prefer a to b, so according to Pareto b
should not be chosen over a. However, option c is also on the Pareto frontier
because there is no alternative that everyone prefers to c. We can say then that the
Pareto principle is not decisive here because both a and c are compatible with it.
Alternatively, if we appeal to freedom, perhaps claiming that Epicurean Doctor has a
right to freedom of occupation, then we must make (some of) Epicurean Doctor’s
preferences over her occupation decisive and a will be the likely winner.26
Appealing to equality, however, yields a different result. If we assume that
alternative c (doctoring at $20,000) maximizes the condition of the least well off,

Strictly speaking freedom picks out either a or b depending upon which pair of alternatives {a, c} or {b, c}
Epicurean Doctor is decisive over. The important point is that freedom effectively rules out c and ultimately yields a as
the social choice either directly (if Epicurean Doctor is decisive over a and c) or indirectly (if Epicurean Doctor is decisive
over b and c, in which case freedom picks out b and Pareto leads us to a because a > b by everyone). Note that we
can ignore the pair {a, b} because freedom allows Epicurean Doctor to decide which pair she is decisive over and
because society prefers that she doctor at $50,000 (a) to gardening at $20,000 (b), there is no need for her to exercise
her decisiveness over that pair. Our earlier discussion of Sen’s minimal liberalism condition, explains why it is
necessary that Epicurean Doctor be allowed to decide which pair she is decisive over, namely that if our freedom
condition is to be substantive, Epicurean Doctor must not only be decisive over at least one pair of alternatives, but she
must be free (within some substantial range) to choose which pair of alternatives she should be decisive over.
26
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then even though Epicurean Doctor ranks option c last, it is the option picked out by
the equality metric.27 We summarize these outcomes in Table 2 below:

Table 2

Freedom

a (or b)

Equality

c

Pareto

a or c

Referring to Table 2 we can see that freedom and Pareto are compatible
since they each yield a as an eligible social choice. Pareto and equality are,
similarly, compatible since they each leave c in the eligible set. Freedom and
equality, however, do not yield compatible choices. If we appeal to equality,
freedom is swamped. Everyone Else becomes decisive over the pairs {a, c} and {b, c}
and is thus able to dictate both Epicurean Doctor’s job and salary. This result suggests
that an uncompromising commitment to equality requires that we sacrifice
freedom in cases where an individual’s preferences conflict with the interests of the
least well off. Alternatively, if we appeal to freedom and allow (again, some of)
Epicurean Doctor’s preferences to be decisive, then the least well off will be worse off
than they might otherwise be. This is the deep tension between the values that
We grant for the sake of argument that this is a reasonable assumption since society needs doctors and c involves
the Epicurean Doctor, working for less money, thus leaving society with more money which it might then use to benefit
the least well off in other ways.
27
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concern liberals versus the values that concern egalitarians. Because Cohen is
concerned with showing that a commitment to equality does not require us to
sacrifice freedom, we focus on the former result and in the next section we look at
his proposed solution to this problem.

2. The Ethical Solution
As Cohen recognizes, his example involving the Epicurean Doctor is analogous to
Sen’s Prude/Lewd example from his argument for the impossibility of Paretian
liberalism. Contra Sen, however, Cohen argues that it is a mistake to think that
minimal rights must conflict with Pareto or, carrying the point over to his own
example, with equality. Cohen's primary contention is that “liberalism does not
require that you exercise the sovereignty it grants in accordance with your otherthings-equal first preferences.”28 He also argues however that the notion of
liberalism embodied in Sen’s “minimal liberalism” and captured by the freedom
principle we have used, is not at all similar to the liberalism that he claims to share
with Dworkin and Rawls.29
With respect to his second point, Cohen is simply mistaken. To be valuable,
freedom or liberal rights must give significant weight to protecting individuals from

28

Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p. 187.

29

Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p. 188.

Page 14
having the preferences of others imposed on them. Of course, an individual may
decide not to exercise a right in a given case—Cohen is right about this much—but
to be significant, that decision must presuppose the individual’s ability to exercise
the right should she desire.30 To say that a minimally liberal set of rights conflicts
with Pareto and equality then is to say that if some individuals exercised their rights
either Pareto or equality must be sacrificed. Indeed, this was the point of Sen’s
original argument, namely that rights and social welfare will not always coincide,
and it is only once we understand this point on a formal level that we are led to
more substantive philosophical questions concerning which values justice requires
us to be sensitive to and in what kinds of situations.31
Cohen is making a deeper point as well though, viz. that the demands of
justice extend beyond those placed on the basic structure of society, and it is on this
deeper point that his main line of argument against the problem posed by the
trilemma rests.32 Cohen's argument is that if the decisions we made in our individual
It is true that elsewhere Cohen famously characterizes freedom in terms of ability, and in his example the
Epicurean doctor is surely able to choose the occupation of her choice. Our point is simply that if freedom is to be
substantively valuable, justice must carve out a range of choices, which an individual is free to choose among,
consistent with the demands of justice.
30

Indeed, this point, and the larger point that the point of theorizing about justice is to provide practical guidance in
alleviating suffering and solving disputes is the primary thesis of Sen's recent book and has also been powerfully
articulated by David Schmidtz. See Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2009) and David Schmidtz, ‘When Justice Matters’, Ethics, 117 (2007), pp. 433–459.
31

This is one of the main thrusts of Cohen's book and is an issue about which there has been much debate. See:
Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, chap. 4; Liam B. Murphy, ‘Institutions and the Demands of Justice’, Philosophy &
Public Affairs, 27 (1998), 251–291; Thomas W. Pogge, ‘On the Site of Distributive Justice: Reflections on Cohen and
Murphy’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 29 (2000), 137–169; A. J. Julius, ‘Basic Structure and the Value of Equality’,
32
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lives were guided by a belief in equality, the trilemma dissolves. Justice, he argues,
requires us to internalize certain values and once we do so, our preference for
exercising our rights in ways that generate the sort of conflict the proponent of the
trilemma worries about will vanish. Cohen refers to this as the Ethical Solution and
motivates it with the following imaginary exchange:

The trilemmist says: “We shouldn’t be egalitarians, because equality requires
a sacrifice of either Pareto or freedom.” To which I reply: “That isn’t so,
because, if we were egalitarians, we should be sacrificing neither.” And that
reply isn’t trivial.33

Cohen’s argument is that once the Epicurean Doctor realizes the importance of
equality she would (or should) change her preferences. If she really cared about
equality, freedom would not be an issue.
Of course, the Epicurean Doctor might simply respond that if Everyone Else really
cared about freedom, they would leave her alone to pursue her preferred profession
without interference. In either case, though, solving the problem this way merely
sidesteps the serious philosophical questions concerning how social justice should
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 31 (2003), 321–355; Thomas Porter, ‘The Division of Moral Labour and the Basic
Structure Restriction’, Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 8 (2009), 173–199; Kok-Chor Tan, Justice, Institutions, and Luck:
The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality (Oxford University Press, USA, 2012).
33

Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p. 196.
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accommodate competing values. Cohen's argument is that in a truly just society,
people’s preferences would align with equality and, hence, it would never conflict
with the other two metrics. This amounts to saying that if the Epicurean Doctor cared
about equality she would prefer to work as a doctor at $20,000 rather than garden
or work as a doctor at a higher wage. Her preference ordering would change from
a > b > c to c > a > b and since her preferences would now be the same as Everyone
Else’s no trilemma would arise. We say this approach sidesteps the difficult
philosophical issues at hand, because it is hard to see how it shows that the trilemma
is not really a problem. In this case, justice free from conflict is merely the product
of philosophical fiat. Cohen “solves” the trilemma argument by stipulating that it
never arises.34
For his solution to be of general interest, Cohen needs to show that the
preference profiles that give rise to the trilemma are inadmissible. Essentially,
Cohen needs to show that we have good reason to reject the unrestricted domain
condition that we implicitly assumed in the Epicurean Doctor example.35 Sen

Note that the problem is more dramatic still. For Cohen’s solution not only requires that individuals be motivated
to pursue egalitarian policies, but the same egalitarian policies, otherwise the problem of divergence of preferences
will arise even assuming an egalitarian ethos. Rawls in particular, whose animating concern was the problem posed
by the fact of reasonable pluralism, would have been particularly attuned to this worry.
34

Cohen’s solution to the trilemma exploits the well-known fact in the social choice literature that only certain
preference profiles generate the paradoxes of social choice that the famous impossibility theorems threaten. Like
Cohen here, many have attempted to defang the threat of various impossibility theorems by weakening the
unrestricted domain assumption that Arrow’s impossibility theorem, among others, relies upon. Unfortunately, one
of the most dispiriting lessons in social choice has been that many forms of impossibility are resilient in the face of a
substantial degree of weakening of their axioms. Furthermore, the type of restriction that Cohen proposes is not
35
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describes unrestricted domain as the condition that “every logical possible set of
individual orderings is included in the domain of the collective choice rule.”36 In
other words, no individuals or preference orderings should be excluded from the
scope of the collective choice rule—in this case, the rule being used to model the
requirements of justice. Of course, it is by no means obvious that justice must
license the range of preferences that the unrestricted domain condition allows,
particularly if justice requires (as Cohen thinks it does) that individuals internalize a
certain ethos, and so Cohen's strategy perhaps looks promising. In the next section,
however we will see that Cohen lacks the resources needed to restrict the domain of
acceptable preferences to the extent required by his solution to the trilemma.

3. Vacations, Sick Days, and Prerogatives
In his earlier work, Cohen argues in favor of a principle of symmetrical of justification for
coercion.37 In Rescuing, however, his discussion of justification is framed first in terms of
something he calls the interpersonal test,38 and later in terms of the idea of a personal prerogative

trivial as he is essentially proposing restricting the domain of individual preferences so that they are identical with the
set of social preferences.
36

Sen, 'The Impossibility of the Paretian Liberal', p. 153.

37

G. A. Cohen, Self-ownership, Freedom, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 56–57.

See Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, chap. 1, Section 5. According to Cohen, as free and equal members of a
moral community our relationships ought to be structured by a norm of comprehensive justification and a necessary
condition of comprehensive justification is that arguments be capable of passing the interpersonal test, where this
requires that an argument must be capable of providing justification under any and all dialogical conditions. In other
words, an argument’s ability to provide justification must be independent of both who is presenting it and to whom it is
being presented.
38
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first sketched by Samuel Scheffler and subsequently developed by David Estlund.39 Cohen begins
the trilemma chapter trilemma with the observation that the demands of egalitarian justice must
fall “within the constraint of a reasonable personal prerogative, deference to which informs the
whole of the following discussion,” only a moral rigorist, he argues, could deny a place for such a
prerogative, while affirming that he is not such a rigorist.40

Prerogatives are important because valuing the freedom of persons to pursue
a conception of the good requires that they have considerable room within to make
decisions about their life and prerogatives provide people with this space.41
Prerogatives protecting occupational choice are especially important in this regard.
No less important is being free to choose how to trade off time spent working with
time spent with one’s friends and family, or pursuing other interests and passions.
Treating people as free then requires that individuals have the prerogative to make
their own choices about how to live their lives even if this means that there will be
some who do worse than they otherwise might.
While Cohen accepts that there is a place for a modest personal prerogative within his
view of justice, there are two ways of understanding such prerogatives. On one hand,
prerogatives can be conceived as “vacations” from the demands of justice. Vacations are justified
departures from the requirements of justice that allow individuals a certain amount of space to

David Estlund, ‘Liberalism, Equality, and Fraternity in Cohen’s Critique of Rawls’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 6
(1998), p. 99 and Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
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freely pursue their own projects, regardless of how these pursuits relate to distributive justice.42
Conceived of in this way, prerogatives prevent justice from being all-encompassing. Alternatively,
prerogatives can be thought of as “sick days.” Thought of this way, prerogatives are excuses for
failing to live up to the demands of justice. However, just as it would perhaps be better if
individuals didn’t have to take sick days from work, it would also be more just if people
minimized the number of prerogatives taken to depart from the demands of justice.
It sounds odd though to say that we should treat prerogatives just as we do sick days. This
requires us to think that individuals’ pursuing their own projects is something to regret⎯a
necessary evil. Acting in accordance with justice, on this model, is a kind of Stakhanovism.43 If
this is Cohen’s view, he is in danger of repeating the mistake that Bernard Williams and Rawls
attribute to utilitarianism: that it does not take the separateness of persons seriously, viewing
people instead as mere nodes for the fulfillment of justice.
To make the distinction we have drawn even starker, note that individuals are often
expected and even encouraged to take vacations from work, lest they allow their work to cause
them to lose sight of the other important things in life. Although one’s occupation is often bound
up with one’s identity, and in many cases helps to give life meaning, what makes the freedom to
choose one’s occupation important are the myriad values, interests, and larger scale projects that
individuals have which give them reasons to shape their identities in various ways. While these
are issues that Cohen is sensitive to, unfortunately he does not fully appreciate the constraints
they impose on a view like his. Although he accepts that justice must make room for a reasonable

For a more complete discussion of a view like this see: David Estlund, ‘Liberalism, Equality, and Fraternity in
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personal prerogative he tells us little about what falls within the scope of such a prerogative nor,
as we have seen, does he tell us how such prerogatives mediate the demands of justice.44
This second point is particularly important, for if prerogatives are best conceived of along
the vacation model as we have argued they should be, then it is hard to see how Cohen can
constrain the domain of admissible preferences to the degree required to get his ethical solution off
the ground. This is because the only way the ethical solution succeeds is if individuals could come to
have such a strong egalitarian ethos that their occupational preferences coincide with what would
best promote the needs of the least well off. As we will see in the next two sections though, even if
individuals could come to adopt such an equality driven ethos, there are reasons to doubt
whether they should. Before exploring this argument, though, it is important to first clarify why
the ethical solution succeeds only if the domain of free choice is severely curtailed.
The problem is that prerogatives license inequalities and we have good reason to concede
that individuals have prerogatives within which they are free to act. Cohen admits as much. His
disagreement with those like Estlund and Scheffler who have drawn attention to the inequality
generating feature of prerogatives is directed solely at the amount of inequality that reasonable
prerogatives license and the way in which they do so.45 Cohen accepts that prerogatives allow
individuals to justifiably make choices that generate inequality, but contra Estlund he argues that

In the introduction to Rescuing, for instance, Cohen points out that there are many forms of motivation lying on a
spectrum that stretches from unrestrained market-maximizing at one end to fully self-sacrificial restraint favoring the
worst off at the other. He then argues that the first extreme is permitted by Rawls, something that he finds absurd,
but he also argues that the second extreme isn't required because requiring such self-sacrifice is "excluded by a
legitimate personal prerogative." Because individuals have their own lives to lead, Cohen suggests "they are therefore
permitted to strike a balance between the claims of the difference principle and their own legitimate concerns." The
difficulty, on Cohen's view, is that what constitutes an appropriate balance is a "vague matter." Cohen, Rescuing
Justice and Equality, pp. 10–11.
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the amount of inequality that is thus justified is not extensive. This is a debate about the extent of
inequality that is justified, though, and not a debate about whether it is justified. Similarly, Cohen
emphasizes that the prerogative justification provides a different sort of justification for inequality
than the incentive argument that grounds the difference principle, but this too does little to cut
against the claim that some inequalities will be justified because it only speaks to the question of
how those inequalities are justified.46 This is important because our argument has been directed
at Cohen's claim that equality, freedom, and Pareto are not in conflict. We have denied Cohen's
claim, and in doing so, what we have argued is that Cohen must license some inequality if he is
to maintain his commitment to freedom. What we have not tried to say, however, is how much
inequality he must make room for.

4. The Women of Athens
In the “Ecclesiazusae,” Aristophanes depicts an Athens racked by war and
deprivation, having been run into the ground by the men. In response, the women
of the city take over the legislative assembly and, in an effort to save Athens from
total ruin; their first act is to legislate absolute equality between all Athenians.
Their leader Praxagora decrees that, “Mankind should possess in common the
instruments of happiness. Henceforth private property comes to an end...”47 The

It is also worth noting that in his reply to critics Cohen eventually acknowledges, following Estlund, that
prerogatives could serve to legitimate certain deployments of the incentive argument. His argument with Estlund on
that point being that there is simply no trace of such an argument to be found in Rawls's work.
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plan, as Praxagora elaborates, is to “destroy [the old] morality”48 and supplant it
with a new ethos, the hope being that by working together and owning all things in
common Athenians could come to build a society on a foundation of equality.
Praxagora is, like Cohen, ultimately concerned with equality of welfare, not
equality of money and because one of the aspects of life that can contribute the
most to happiness and welfare is love, she becomes concerned about the vast
inequities of love that naturally exist. Recognizing that it is hard for the old, the
ugly, and the awkward to compete with those younger, prettier, and smoother for
the affections of potential lovers, the women outlaw marriage in the city and even
go so far as to make it illegal for the young and pretty to have their turn at love
without first allowing the older and uglier a chance.49
In one scene, a pretty young girl is waiting for her lover while an old woman
stands close by. Eventually the young man arrives, seeking the young girl. The
older woman, spying her chance, demands that the young man obey the new law.
Horrified at what justice now requires of him, the young man tries to trick the old
woman, but to no avail. She prevails and drags him off into her room. At just that
moment, though, an older, uglier woman shows up to claim her right and the first
woman is forced to give him over to her older and uglier competitor. Naturally, as

48

Aristophanes, ‘Ecclesiazusae’, p. 439.

49

Aristophanes, ‘Ecclesiazusae’, p. 457.

Page 23
the second old woman is taking the young man away a third appears, older and
uglier still. As the third old woman says, “I’m older, and I’m uglier; consequently
this boy belongs to me.”50 Given the multiplicity of women arranged in a hierarchy
of unattractiveness, the young man will have to work his way down the line if he
intends to ever be with his lover.
While the young man has no interest in being with any of the old women,
alas, his wishes are irrelevant. If he could do as he wished and be only with his
beloved, the old women would be much worse off in relation to the young couple.
From the point of view of justice, at least as instantiated by the women of Athens,
this is unacceptable. If the young man wishes to pursue the girl, he does indeed
“belong” to the oldest woman first, because her happiness and welfare, overrule his
freedom to choose his partners. There is a sense, then, in which the young man has
become merely a means to the old women's satisfaction. This case clearly illustrates
what it is like for individuals to be treated merely as material for the fulfillment of
justice. What makes it particularly compelling though is that Cohen is clearly
committed to thinking that it is inconsistent with justice to treat individuals in this
way.51
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Recall, for instance, Cohen's claim from the introduction to Rescuing that individuals have the right to be
something other than engines for the welfare of other people.
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As we did with the case of the Epicurean Doctor, we can formalize
Aristophanes' story. In the Aristophanes case, however, unlike the Epicurean Doctor
case, we have many preference orderings rather than simply two. Furthermore, the
preferences range over who may be with whom in a romantic situation and so the
example is even starker than the Cohen’s original case insofar as it involves action
that is even more personal than occupational choice.52
In order to simplify things, in what follows, we represent this situation as
involving three persons, though the older and uglier women that enter later could
easily be incorporated without changing the result. The Young Man prefers to be
with the Young Woman and only the Young Woman. We can call this state of
affairs, x. Nevertheless, if he cannot be with just the Young Woman, he is willing to
be with the Old Woman first and then the Young Woman. He finds the prospect of
being with the Old Woman objectionable, but he is willing to pay that price for
love if he must. We call this state of affairs where the Young Man will be with the
Old Woman first, and then the Young Woman, y. The worst state of affairs for the
Young Man is to miss the opportunity to be with his beloved entirely. This state of
affairs involves everyone leaving the scene without having any romantic

Aside from the already discussed prerogative, there is no reason in principle why Cohen should hold that the
demands of justice should not apply to romantic choice, especially if romantic partners are importantly related to
welfare. We need not be committed to the claim that Cohen would have us all be egalitarians in romantic matters
though. Rather, the point of the example is simply to illustrate the tension between freedom and equality and thus
the need to invoke a prerogative or some other mechanism for resolving this tension.
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involvement at all. We can call this state of affairs z. Thus, the Young Man’s
preference ordering in this situation is: x > y > z.
The Young Woman’s first preference is also to be with her lover the Young
Man without any interference from the Old Woman, and so she prefers

to all

other alternatives. The thought of her lover with the Old Woman angers her so
much however that she would prefer z to y even though this means she would have
to forgo the affection of her lover. The Young Woman’s preference ordering, then,
is: x > z > y. Finally, the Old Woman prefers y to all other states of affairs, but
would be so wrought with jealousy and envy if the Young Woman were able to
have the Young Man to herself that she prefers z to x and so her preference
ordering is: y > z > x.53 These orderings are represented in Table 3 below:
Table 3

Old
Young Man

Young Woman
Woman

x

x

y

y

z

z

z

y

x

We assume for the sake of argument that the Old Woman's preferences accurately track her welfare. As we will see
in the next section, though, there are perhaps problems with making this assumption that in turn give us further
reason to doubt the efficacy of Cohen's proposed solution to the trilemma.
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As in the Epicurean Doctor case, we have a dilemma. We say dilemma, rather
than trilemma here because in this situation, every alternative satisfies the Pareto
principle and so it cannot conflict with our other principles. There is no pair of
alternatives such that one alternative is preferred to the other by everyone. Both
the Young Man and the Young Woman prefer x to y while the Old Woman prefers
y to x and similarly, the Young Man and Young Woman prefer x to z while the Old
Woman prefers z to x.54 On the other hand, the Young Man and the Old Woman
both prefer y to z, while the Young Woman prefers z to y. There is no way then to
reconcile their respective preferences with both equality and the requirement that
each individual be decisive over at least one pair.55

5. The Demands of Equality
In the “Ecclesiazusae,” the women of Athens deem equality to be the unique
collective choice rule consistent with justice. The result is comical. Their
uncompromising commitment to equality threatens to undermine even their most
basic freedoms. We should be worried then by the fact that Aristophanes’ dilemma
parallels the trilemma argument, particularly since Cohen’s proposal that the
trilemma can be dissolved if only we could embrace an ethos of equality is not
To get this result we need not assume transitivity, only quasi-transitivity since we are only dealing with strict
preference orderings without indifference.
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offered in jest. In light of Aristophanes' dilemma, we must ask whether Cohen's
ethical solution really allows us to express an uncompromising commitment to
equality without becoming "slaves to social justice."
Let us assume, following Cohen’s suggestion, that the characters in our
example borrowed from Aristophanes have become perfectly committed to
equality so that the young couple's preferences come to coincide with the Old
Woman's. Their respective preference orderings can then be represented as follows:
Table 4
Original Dilemma

Cohen’s Revised Dilemma
Old

Young Man

Young Woman

Young Man

Young Woman

Old Woman

Woman

x

x

y

y

y

y

y

z

z

z

z

z

z

y

x

x

x

x

Note that the proposed revision of the parties’ preferences does indeed solve the
problem, but as with the Epicurean Doctor case, it is only able to do this by changing
the circumstances. Earlier we charged Cohen with avoiding the problem rather
than confronting it. The point we now wish to make, though, is that Cohen himself
gives us reason to think that we should be hesitant to adopt such an ethos.
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First, however, we must consider what can be said in favor of adopting such
an ethos. There is a similarity for instance between this example and Cohen’s
occasional approval of “everyone doing his or her bit” in wartime England.56 On
Cohen’s view, despite the hardships that accompanied “doing one’s bit”, a certain
amount of fellow feeling and patriotism motivated people to do more than they
might have otherwise done and this is to be celebrated. It does not follow, however,
that since people were motivated by fellow feeling that their hardships were no
longer hardships. Indeed it is precisely because everyone “did their bit” in the face
of these hardships that that fact is to be celebrated. Similarly, the Young Man,
despite his newly acquired egalitarian ethos, will still find the prospect of being with
the older women objectionable, but he will see it as his duty as well and so will
perform the task in spite of this. He may even get a warm feeling knowing that he
has done his duty. The problem we face is that in this case equality is providing the
wrong kind of reason for action.
Cohen opens the door to this argument in the final section of “The Freedom
Objection.” Here, Cohen makes an intriguing argument against prostitution.
Prostitution is wrong, Cohen argues, for the same reason that rape is wrong,
namely because “the wanted thing is yielded for the wrong reason.”57 Of course,
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some might argue with this characterization of rape. It may not be merely sex that
the rapist is after. Rape is, at least some of the time, an exercise of power and
domination and not just a sexual act. Cohen argues, however, that it would be
wrong to view rape merely as a “species of assault.”58 To think of rape in that way
would be to base one’s disapproval of it on a “breach of self-ownership” and would
make one indifferent to prostitution to the extent that prostitution is (at least
sometimes) an expression of self-ownership.
Cohen’s argument here is far from uncontroversial, but rather than dispute
Cohen’s assessment of rape and prostitution we want to consider how Cohen's
claim puts pressure on his proposed solution to the trilemma. In our Aristophanes
example, the Young Man has a duty to have sex with the Old Woman if he ever
wants to be with his lover. Of course, he does not love or desire the Old Woman
and so, although he may be motivated to engage with her, this can only be because
he has embraced his egalitarian ethos so completely. The Young Man’s
commitment to egalitarianism may be commendable, but, like the prostitute, he is
yielding the “wanted thing” for the wrong reasons. While the Young Man is not
being forced to yield his body to the Old Woman because he is motivated to do it,
his commitment to equality or justice does not translate into love or desire for the
Old Woman. It follows, then, that if we are to condemn prostitution and rape
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along the lines that Cohen suggests, we should also condemn this particular act of
“yielding” for the same reasons. It is this, that is bad news for Cohen's ethical
solution, for it shows that even if adopting an egalitarian ethos could dissolve the
trilemma, by Cohen's own lights we sometimes have overriding reasons not to do
so. Sometimes, it seems, there are inequalities that it would be unjust to change.
Of course, the defender of Cohen could argue that what an appropriate
egalitarian ethos really requires of the young couple is that they simply refrain from
being with one another. Thus, the Young Man would not be compelled to yield
himself to the Old Woman for the wrong reasons, but the Old Woman would now
have no reason to envy the young couple's ability to find love. This, we think, goes
too far. While it perhaps does not make the young couple mere engines for the
welfare of the older and less attractive, it does threaten to swallow up any space
they might have in which to live their own lives. More reasonably, Cohen could
argue that romantic choices should fall within the purview of a personal
prerogative. We do not disagree. The problem is that if Cohen grants that choosing
one's romantic partner should fall within the scope of a reasonable prerogative,
then that romantic choices are protected in this way simply serves as proof that the
commitment to equality is not, in the end, uncompromising.
At this point we must consider, whether we have given due weight to
Cohen's sensitivity to the distinction between the relation of the personal and
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impersonal on one hand and the relationship between justice and the personal on
the other.59 The worry as we understand it is that Cohen's sensitivity to this
distinction mitigates much of the criticism that we have levied against him. We
appreciate Cohen's sensitivity to issues like this. We recognize, for instance, that
Cohen would prefer us not to be egalitarians about everything, least of all sex and
love. We struggle to see though how this insulates him from the charges we have
laid at his feet. One reason is that it is hard to see how Cohen can draw a nonarbitrary line between those choices that do and those that do not fall within the
scope of justice. After all, one of the main theses Cohen defends is that "the
personal is political" and thus that the demands of justice extend to the sorts of
decisions individuals make in their everyday lives. Indeed his entire criticism of
Rawls rests on this claim.
More importantly, however, we believe that there is good reason to think
that something like a prerogative does not in fact compete with justice. There is a
deep tension running through Cohen's thought, though, that make it unclear
whether he too can hold this view. Cohen recognizes that, because individuals have
their own lives to lead, at the level of individual decision-making, neither justice nor
equality can be all that matters. On one way of understanding things, this is not
problematic because justice is simply one value among many. Indeed, Cohen

59

We thank an anonymous referee for this journal for raising this point.

Page 32
suggests that "there is some justice that cannot, and some that should not, be
implemented institutionally, or indeed, as Shakespeare's Portia knew, at all."60 On
this view, we must make room for inequality in light of individuals' reasonable
personal prerogatives, but this is not a requirement of justice. Rather, as we argued
in §3, it is a (potentially regrettable) situation that arises because these prerogatives
lie outside the scope of justice. As Cohen also argues, though, the label "justice" is
significant and one reason it is significant is that "each person possesses an
inviolability founded on justice."61 As we see things, making room for a prerogative
is one way of giving force to this powerful idea and the implication of this is not just
that we must make room for inequality, but that these inequalities are sometimes
licensed in the name of justice. This, however, is a conclusion that Cohen is
hesitant to draw.
There is one further problem for the prospects of Cohen's ethical solution that
bears mention. Whatever one thinks of Cohen’s objection to prostitution, it does
suggest an important question, namely whether the merely physical “yielding” of
the Young Man can truly satisfy the Old Woman in the right way? Although we
earlier assumed for the sake of argument that the Old Woman's preferences
accurately tracked her welfare, there are good reasons for believing that the Young
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Man's yielding to her would not in the end satisfy her. For an extremely lonely
person, any human contact is often welcomed. Being with the Young Man might,
very well then, be able to eliminate some of the negative effects of isolation and
alleviate some of the Old Women's loneliness. She would no doubt be aware,
however, that the Young Man did not love her or desire to be with her in any way
except insofar as his sense of equality required it.
Peter Railton, in a similar context, describes this type of situation as a kind of
alienation.62 In his example, a husband performs all the duties that a loving
husband would perform, but his reasons for acting the way that he does is his
devotion to morality not, strictly speaking, his dedication to his wife. As Railton
suggests, “something seems wrong” after all, one doesn’t only want to be treated as
a means of discharging moral duties or as a means of increasing the amount of
well-being in the world.63 Imagine a son telling his mother upon visiting her at her
home that he is visiting her because she is old and lonely and morality requires that
the lonely be visited periodically. Or imagine a wife embracing her husband, not
because she has any particular affection for him but rather because she knows that
her husband’s well-being will improve if he is embraced. Surely, both of these
situations, along with our example borrowed from Aristophanes seem perverse in
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the same way that Cohen thinks prostitution is perverse. Love and affection are
given freely for reasons of love and affection, not for reasons of morality or
equality.
The problem, we have argued, is that however strong the Young Man’s
commitment to equality is, that alone will not allow him to satisfy the demands of
justice. In the trilemma case, Cohen argues that someone with an egalitarian ethos
acts without coercion when they act in accordance with equality and so, freedom
can be consistent with equality. The egalitarian ethos alone, however, will not
achieve equality in the Aristophanes case because acting from an egalitarian ethos
provides the wrong kind of reason to the Young Man. The Old Woman needs the
Young Man to love or desire her for the right reasons, and an egalitarian ethos
does not provide those reasons to the Young Man, no matter how committed he is
to it. Reasons of equality are dictated by how closely they track distributive
desiderata. Reasons of love, on the other hand, come from the deeply held desires
that are directed at the object of love. To truly achieve equality in our example, we
would need to change the desires of the Young Man, but this might not be possible.
Further, even if it were possible, as our discussion of personal prerogatives has
suggested, it may not be desirable for, as Cohen himself affirms, justice should not
be all encompassing in this way. We should not be slaves to social justice.
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Cohen may be right that justice does not license the degree of inequality that
many others have supposed. He may also be right that justice requires us to adopt
an egalitarian ethos. Our suggestion here is simply that even if we grant Cohen’s
claim that adopting an egalitarian ethos may help to alleviate the tension between
co-realizing the values of freedom, equality, and Pareto, we need to do more to
fully dissolve that tension. It is not only minds that need to be changed, but also
hearts, and even that may not be enough.
Finally, although we have levied a series of objections against Cohen’s
proposed solution to the trilemma argument, it is worth noting that the failure of
Cohen’s Ethical Solution does not present the sort of problem that Cohen supposes.
While we might still lament inequality, if justice is about more than just equality,
licensing inequalities in the name of justice need not be self-effacing. On the
contrary, sometimes constraining the reach of justice serves as a way of respecting
the separate worth and importance of individual lives.64
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